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Succeeding generations of Contracts scholars too young to have attended
Friedrich Kessler's Contracts course' can only imagine its content from Fritz's
powerful writings and from his enduring casebook.2 The modem Contracts
course as taught today, however, is surely different. Today, Contracts is a
course addressing the regulation of private transactions in which our courts, as
self-conscious social engineers, are evaluated in terms of their ability to define
rules that optimally assign risks and informational burdens in order to broadly
enhance societal welfare. There is little question today that the role of courts
in resolving contract disputes is to regulate underlying behavior and to protect
parties in unequal bargaining positions. Courts must also define what are called
"default" rules-rules to control where the parties' meaning or intent is
unclear-with attention to problems of monopoly or economic power,
differential informational advantages, and relative risk-bearing ability.' These
are not unimportant issues to a modem society, and the concepts and principles
of modem Contracts are necessary implements in every lawyer's tool chest.
Nevertheless, as a course in applied regulation, Contracts today is not always
a class favorite and, to many, lacks the drama and apparent relevance of more
popular Yale Law School courses, such as those on discrimination, free speech,
or constitutional interpretation.
The Contracts course taught by Fritz Kessler, in contrast, was hardly
lacking in drama or relevance. Kessler saw the various doctrines of contract
law and the principle of freedom of contract as intimately tied to the great
issues of the modem world: the apparent decline of modem capitalism; the
threatened capture of democracy by industrial interests; and the exploitation
t John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School.
1. Including myself (however middle-aged).
2. FRIEDRICH KESSLER, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986) (with Grant Gilmore &
Anthony T. Kronman). Remaining references to the casebook will be to the earlier edition, from which I
first taught and first learned Fritz's ideas: FRIEDRICH KESSLER. CoNrRAcrS: CASES AND MATERIALs (2d
ed. 1970) (with Grant Gilmore) [hereinafter KESSLER, CASEBOOK].
3. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992).
4. Again, to my great personal regret, these observations derive largely from inference from Fritz's
writings, and from one thrilling lecture that Fritz gave to Dean Kronman's and my combined Contracts
classes in the mid-1980's.
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and strangling of the common consumer in a web of contractual obligation. He
viewed the courts as accomplices throughout, well meaning but naive, clinging
by rote to tired doctrines of promise and assent, yielding to an instinct for
justice in a confused manner and without regard to developing a coherent
theory of contractual interpretation.5
Trained under Weber and surely influenced by the fascist German
experience from which he fled (to Yale Law School) in 1934, Kessler believed
that fundamental changes had occurred in the character of Western economies
that deeply threatened democratic societies and individual freedoms.6
According to Kessler, "the process of capitalistic expansion" was gradually
"slowing up,"'7 leading to the disruption of social systems in Western cultures
and "the decline of the free market system."8 Kessler was principally
concerned by the increase in the size of industry and the consequent
aggregation of economic power. The "social order" had deteriorated "into the
pluralistic society of our days with its powerful pressure groups."9 Kessler saw
modem economies as increasingly dominated by large industrial empires,
0
resulting from "the innate trend of competitive capitalism towards
monopoly."" "[T]he capitalistic system has within itself forces which, if
unchecked, will inevitably change a free enterprise system into monopoly
capitalism and a liberal democracy into a pluralistic society which knows
nothing but divided loyalties."' 2
According to Kessler, monopoly capitalism itself was a form of fascism.
In his writings, Kessler did not distinguish between the German and American
experiences nor between political and economic fascism. Kessler was
concerned about the decline of freedom in any dimension and saw the greatest
threat to the West as the decline in economic freedom resulting from monopoly
capitalism. "[T]he rise of fascism in our industrial world has made us realize
that democratic freedom is not inevitable. Industrial man living in a mass
society has to choose between democracy and totalitarian dictatorship."' 3
Kessler saw the growth of industrial fascism of the last forty years in the
5. For a similar-though much richer-description of Kessler's views emphasizing his devotion to
contract theory, see Grant Gilmore's tribute upon Fritz's retirement, Friedrich Kessler, 84 YALE L.J. 672
(1975).
6. This discussion draws from a more extensive description of Fritz's extraordinary influence on the
development of our modem civil liability regime-especially products liability-in George L. Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 483-96 (1985) [hereinafter Priest, Invention].
7. Friedrich Kessler, Natural Law, Justice and Democracy-Some Reflections on Three Types of
Thinking About Law and Justice, 19 TUL. L. REv. 32, 50 (1944) [hereinafter Kessler, Natural Law].
8. Id. at 33.
9. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM.
L. REv. 629, 641 (1943) [hereinafter Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion].
10. See, e.g., id. at 632.
11. Id. at 640.
12. Kessler, Natural Law, supra note 7. at 52-53.
13. Id. at 33.
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increase in vertical integration and the development of sophisticated marketing
techniques for controlling product distribution." Single firms were now able
"to control and regulate the distribution of goods from producer all the way
down to the ultimate consumer."'"
According to Kessler, the principal technique for achieving vertical
integration, the principal tool of mass marketing and, thus, the principal
implements of corporate fascism were contracts and the creation of ironclad
contractual obligations. The formation of large industrial empires had been
made possible by contract and by standardized contracts in particular. 6 In one
set of studies, Kessler examined modem franchise and agency distribution
programs, and uncovered standardized contracts incorporating requirements
provisions, output provisions, exclusive dealing provisions, 7  tying
arrangements,"8 and a wide range of industry- or firm-specific restrictions on
distributor behavior.' 9 Kessler saw these various contractual restraints as
conferring extraordinary economic power on producers while victimizing
distributors.
In another set of studies, Kessler examined contracts extended directly to
consumers, such as insurance contracts,' and found even more egregious
constraints on freedom. His deservedly famous essay Contracts of
Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract2' described the plight
of consumers, in need of necessary goods and services, who can only accept
the terms of the standardized contracts offered them, without bargaining and
without effective choice. In modem times there is no shopping around for
better terms "either because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly
(natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses."'2,
In both commercial and consumer contexts, thus, the use of standardized
contracts enabled powerful industrial interests to simultaneously expand their
authority and restrict the risks to which they were exposed. The standardized
contract had become a "weapon of industrial warfare,"' and was responsible
for the rise of monopoly capitalism. Kessler concluded that modem contractual
practice was the principal threat to contemporary political and economic
freedom.
14. See Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract. 66 YALE
LJ. 1135, 1136 (1957) [hereinafter Kessler, Automobile Dealers].
15. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 9, at 632.
16. Id.
17. Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stem, Competition. Contract, and Vertical Integraton, 69 YALE
LJ. 1 (1959).
18. Id. at 61-62.
19. See generally Kessler, Automobile Dealers. supra note 14.
20. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract. 1954 INS. LI. 151: Fnedrich
Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modem Sales Law (pt. 1). 74 YALE L.. 262 (1964)
[hereinafter Kessler, Protection of the Consumer].
21. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 9.
22. Id. at 632.
23. KESSLER, CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 7.
1995] 2147
HeinOnline -- 104 Yale L.J. 2147 1994-1995
The Yale Law Journal
Kessler's vision of vertical integration and the use of standardized
contracts as forms of totalitarianism was a part of a broader theory that
explained the importance of contract law to the course of modem history since
the Middle Ages. Following Weber, Kessler regarded contract law as the
essential link between the economic character of society and the extent of
available freedom. According to Kessler, contract law had made possible the
escape from feudalism into the modem world.24
The triumph of capitalism during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, with its spectacular increase in the productivity of labor,
was possible only because of a constant refinement of the division of
labor. This development in turn presupposed that enterprisers could
depend on a continuous flow of goods and services exchanged in a
free market.25
Contract law, thus, "became the indispensable instrument of the enterpriser,
enabling him to go about his affairs in a rational way., 26 For the development
of industry, it was necessary that the legal system facilitate maximum
opportunities for productive exchange at a minimum cost of compliance with
legal formalities.2 "Society, therefore, has to give the parties freedom of
contract., 28 The concept of freedom of contract "is the inevitable counterpart
of a free enterprise system."'29
Kessler's modem studies, however, demonstrated that the role of the
principle of freedom of contract in the development of Western economies had
dramatically changed. Though in the eighteenth century the principle of
freedom of contract had introduced an unprecedented scope of individual
liberty by facilitating commerce, in the modem world it had become an
instrument of coercion. According to Kessler, freedom of contract in the
context of mass production and mass distribution was an illusion. Standardized
contracts allowed the party with stronger bargaining power to impose its will
on the weaker party.3°
Kessler, thus, turned Maine's theory of status to contract on its head.3'
In today's economies, contract was employed to reinstitute a form of feudal
subjugation that had been cast off centuries earlier. "Standard contracts...
[had] become effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and
commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their own
24. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 9, at 640-41.
25. KESSLER, CASEBOOK, supra note 2, at 2.
26. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 9, at 629.
27. Id.
28. IaL
29. Id. at 630; see id. at 640.
30. Id. at 632.
31. See id. at 641. Kessler's Contracts of Adhesion was written for a Symposium in which several
essays examined the current relevance of Maine's theory.
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making upon a vast host of vassals. 32 The ancient principle of freedom of
contract had become an instrument of oppression comparable to those
employed by totalitarian political regimes. "Freedom of contract enables
enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is even more important, to
legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without using the appearance
of authoritarian forms., 33 Kessler declared in a near-brilliant aphorism that
in the modem world the exercise "of freedom of contract" had become "the
exercise of power by contract. '
Kessler criticized courts that blindly enforced to the letter the terms of
standardized franchise or insurance contracts as unwitting accessories to the
modem exploitation of economic power. Giving force to the terms of contracts
of adhesion-terms that were dictated, not negotiated, and dictated by the more
powerful interest-served only to aggravate existing inequalities.
With the decline of the free enterprise system ... the meaning of
contract has changed radically. Society, when granting freedom of
contract, does not guarantee that all members of the community will
be able to make use of it to the same extent. On the contrary, the law,
by protecting the unequal distribution of property, does nothing to
prevent freedom of contract from becoming a one-sided privilege.35
Of course, not all modem courts were insensitive to differences in
economic power, but Kessler saw efforts to redress the problem as
unsystematic and ineffectual. In his study of automobile franchise agreements,
for example, he provided instances in which courts had interpreted a franchise
contract to redress some form of economic coercion by the manufacturer, only
to have the manufacturer subsequently redraft the standard agreement to
recapture the economic advantage.3 6 Where standardized contracts and
contracts of adhesion prevailed, this problem could not be solved without
broader measures.
Kessler outlined new principles of contractual interpretation that he
believed would provide courts sufficient authority to offset the power of
industrial interests. His famous and influential article (with Edith Fine) "Culpa
in Contrahendo" 37 set forth the importance to modem contract law of broad
application of the principles of good faith and fair dealing, elaborating points
that he had made in his more specific studies of contractual behavior. 8




36. Kessler, Automobile Dealers, supra note 14, at 1150-53, 1164-65.
37. Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contmhendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom
of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1964).
38. For example, Kessler, Automobile Dealers, supra note 14, at 1145. 1149, 1177. 1189.
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In this and in other respects, I believe, Kessler viewed himself as an
activist reformer. He identified himself with the realist reform effort and
viewed his work as part of the sustained attack on the substantive due process
approach of the Supreme Court. In a revealing essay describing philosophical
bases for the reformulation of contract law, Kessler described a "new
sociological school of thought," legal realism, which is committed to the
important task "of constantly testing out the desirability, efficiency and fairness
of inherited legal rules and institutions in terms of the present needs of
society."'31 The legal realists stood in opposition to a school of analytical
jurisprudence, "which claims that the function of law is to be limited to 'the
care of security."' 4 According to Kessler, "In time of transition like ours, the
inherent weakness of this kind of positivism becomes apparent, and the
doctrine that it is not wisdom but authority that makes a law becomes a
dangerous slogan."'" Perhaps descriptive of the group of Yale Law School
realists of his generation working for social reform, Kessler explains:
Challenged by ... the ever-increasing tension between political
democracy and capitalism, many of the modem realists have devoted
their energies not to efforts at improving analytical theories, but to the
task of rebuilding our democracy in accordance with the new social
needs. They have joined the New Deal and its agencies, abandoning
Locke's idea of the neutral state and returning to Bentham's state of
social reforms in the interest of the greatest happiness of the greatest
number. Law to them is more than an argumentative technique ....
It is a unified attempt at freedom and social justice.4"
Although not fully appreciative of the full range of Kessler's ideas when
I first taught from his Casebook, these surely are the themes of the course:
from Kessler's introductory essay, "Contract as a Principle of Order," to
Chapter 3 illustrating the erosion of the doctrine of privity of contract, to
Chapter 5 addressing "Bargaining and Economic Liberty," through the later
chapters, almost never taught today, such as Chapter 17, "Contract as a Device
for Industrial Integration," Chapter 18, "Automobile Dealer Franchises:
Vertical Integration by Contract," and the concluding Chapter 19, "Status and
Contract in Insurance.
43
Quite obviously, however, in comparison to the themes of Kessler's
Contracts course, our modem course seems dull and bloodless. Kessler saw the
reform of contract law as essential to the preservation of capitalism and
democracy, to the control of industrial empires, and to the protection of the
39. Kessler, Natural Law, supra note 7, at 52.
40. I at 52.
41. Id. at 53.
42. Id. at 54.
43. KEssLME, CASEBOOK, supra note 2.
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citizen-consumer. Modem concems over risk allocation and optimal default
rules as implements of social engineering seem a pale contrast.
But to compare the Contracts course under Kessler to the modem
Contracts course in these terms alone is unfair because it ignores Kessler's
intervening influence on modem contract law. Kessler invoked the great
themes of capitalist development, the control of industrial empires, and the
redress of inequalities of power to press courts to abandon their reliance on
formalistic doctrines and, instead, to become social engineers. Kessler saw
reform where courts declaimed rote commitment to interpreting contracts
according to their letter and began to seriously consider as significant elements
of contractual interpretation differential economic power, the allocation of risks
in the context of unequal bargaining ability, and relative informational
advantages.
Our modem Contracts course is different from Kessler's, thus, because
Kessler's approach has prevailed. The principle of liberty of contract as an
element of substantive due process jurisprudence is largely dead. Our courts
have become self-conscious social engineers. The reality of differential market
power, informational advantages, and relative risk-bearing abilities have
become foundational elements of modem contractual interpretation.
Of course, one can question whether, as Kessler believed, standardized
contracts and even contracts of adhesion always serve exploitative purposes.'
In addition, judicial efforts-inspired by Kessler-to redress apparent
economic inequalities between manufacturers and consumers through
innovative legal doctrines are open to criticism. 5 Yet it is far from clear that
Kessler would not join at least some of these concerns. Kessler strongly
advocated contract, rather than tort law, as the appropriate doctrinal base for
addressing the problem of inequalities in power.46 This view has become
increasingly popular in modem times, 4 although often without reference to
Kessler's powerful advocacy.
Yet, in an age in which Kessler's vision of our courts as social engineers
has triumphed, such disputes are disputes over engineering mechanics, not over
the grand issues of capitalism or the control of industry, nor even over the role
of contract law in modem society. Necessarily, the modern Contracts course
is less stirring and dramatic than Kessler's, as a settled peace is less stirring
and dramatic than Kessler's struggle to convince the world of his ideas.
44. George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty. 90 YALE LJ. 1297 (1981).
45. See, e.g., Priest, Invention, supra note 6; George L. Priest. The Current Insurance Cnszs and
Modem Tort Law. 96 YALE LJ. 1521 (1987).
46. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Products Liability. 76 YALE Li. 887 (1967); Kessler. Protection of
the Consumer, supra note 20.
47. See, e.g., PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT (1993).
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